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Abstract
We run an experiment that gives subjects the opportunity to hedge away ambiguity in
an Ellsberg-style experiment. Subjects are asked to make two bets on the same draw
from an ambiguous urn, with a coin flip deciding which bet is paid. By modifying the
timing of the draw, coin flip, and decision, we are able to test the reversal-of-order
axiom, particularly as it relates to the ability of the Random-Lottery Incentive System
(RLIS) to prevent cross-task contamination in an ambiguity setting. We find that we
cannot reject that the reversal-of-order axiom holds. This suggests that hedging could
still be possible when carefully implementing RLIS. However, we also find low levels of
ambiguity hedging across the board, suggesting the existence of the hedging possibility
does not necessarily represent a common problem in ambiguity experiments.
JEL codes: C91, C72, D74.
Keywords: Ellsberg paradox, hedging, reversal of order axiom, experiment.
∗We would like to thank Yaron Azrieli, Adam Dominiak, Peter Dürsch, Jürgen Eichberger, Itzhak Gilboa,
Jean-Philippe Lefort, Kyoungwon Seo, Stefan Trautmann, Peter Wakker, and participants of the workshop
for Behavioral Game Theory, University of East Anglia, 2016, and seminar at Maastricht University for
comments. The University of Heidelberg provided financial support for the experiments.





As a thought experiment, the Ellsberg paradox has given rise to a huge theoretical literature
on ambiguity.1 When it comes to implementing the Ellsberg paradox in an incentivized
experiment, however, there remain some important challenges. In particular, it is still
unclear how to pay subjects for multiple decisions without allowing for hedging.2 Consider
a standard two-color Ellsberg urn consisting of an unknown number of blue and yellow
balls and suppose a subject is asked to bet 5 euro on the outcome of one draw from this
urn. If he is ambiguity averse, he may attach a low value to betting on a blue ball. In
isolation, the same would happen if he is asked to bet on a yellow ball. However, if he is
asked to bet twice and both bets are paid (and only one ball is drawn per urn), the subject
may combine the two bets and realize that if he bets once on blue and once on yellow, he
can guarantee himself a fixed payment of 5. This already shows that it not a good idea
to pay for both questions in this setting.
The Random-Lottery Incentive System (RLIS) was designed to address cross-task-
contamination problems (see e.g. Starmer and Sugden, 1991). The RLIS pays for one
randomly chosen decision (e.g. chosen by a coin toss). However, as pointed out recently by
Oechssler and Roomets (2014), Bade (2015), and Kuzmics (2015) this does not help much
in ambiguity settings if the coin toss that determines the decision to be paid out comes at
the end of the experiment. In this case, betting once on blue and once on yellow guarantees
in total the (objective) 50:50 lottery of winning 5. This way, all ambiguity is hedged away,
an observation which recalls Raiﬀa’s (1961) critique of Ellsberg’s experiment.3 In fact, if
Anscombe and Aumann’s (1963) “Reversal of order” axiom is assumed, the hedge works
regardless of the order in which the urn draw and the coin toss are performed, since the
axiom states that it is immaterial for a decision maker whether the coin is tossed first and
then the ball is drawn from the urn, or vice versa.
Azrieli et al. (2015) conduct a very careful theoretical analysis of the conditions under
which the RLIS is incentive compatible. They show that one of the few conditions under
1Schmeidler (1989), Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), Klibanoﬀ et al. (2005) to name just a few. There is
also a large experimental literature, recently surveyed by Trautmann and van de Kuilen (2016) or Oechssler
and Roomets (2015).
2Most ambiguity experiments involve at least two decisions for each subject in order to establish a
contradiction to expected utility theory.
3An important diﬀerence to Raiﬀa’s critique is that Raiﬀa imagined that a decision maker randomizes
in his head. A frequent counterargument is that there is a commitment problem: once the decision makers
performed the randomization, he faces the ambiguity again. With the RLIS, the randomization and the
commitment device is provided by the experimenter.
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which the RLIS is not incentive compatible is under ambiguity when the reversal of order
axiom is maintained. However, the axiom need not be satisfied (see e.g. Seo, 2009, and
Saito, 2015, for criticism and alternatives to the reversal of order axiom). Baillon et al.
(2015) depart from the reversal of order axiom and show that, theoretically, incentive
compatibility can be rescued when the coin is tossed (but not revealed) before decisions
are taken. Before we can embrace this procedure for the practical design of experiments,
two issues should be tested. (1) Does the order of coin toss, urn draw, and decision matter
at all in experiments? So far, to our knowledge there is no experimental test of the reversal
of order axiom. (2) Do subjects actually hedge, in particular, when the opportunity is
presented to them on a silver platter? This question is important to all experimenters who
worry about unintended hedging opportunities in ambiguity experiments.
In this paper we address those two questions using an experiment. The experiment
asks subjects to make two bets on a single draw from an Ellsberg urn, only one of which
is actually employed. A coin flip is used to decide which of the two bets to employ (the
other becomes irrelevant). We then manipulate the order of the decision, the urn draw,
and the coin flip. We find that (1) the reversal of order axiom seems to hold. Subjects are
not significantly influenced by the order of coin flip, urn draw, and decision. And (2) the
majority of subjects do not take up the opportunity to hedge (confirming Dominiak and
Schnedler, 2011).
2 Experimental design
In our experiment, subjects had to make bets on the outcomes of a fair coin and a draw
from an urn with 24 balls.4 The urn contained blue and yellow balls in a composition that
was unknown to subjects. Subjects were told that any combination from 0 blue balls (and
24 yellow balls) to 24 blue balls (and 0 yellow balls) was possible.
In particular, subjects had to place one bet on the color of the drawn ball if the coin
came up heads and one bet if it came up tails (see Appendix A for the decision sheet).
This implied that subjects had the choice among four alternatives as illustrated in Table 1.
Each subject just made one such (combined) decision. If the correct color was predicted,
they received 5. If not, they received nothing (apart from the show-up fee of 3, which
everyone received). It was important that subjects faced just one incentivized question
4 In the actual experiment, we used a non-transperant bag and blue and yellow marbles. For expositional
reasons, we employ the more customary urns and balls in the text.
2
in the whole experiment in order to avoid any confounding factors like hedging or income
eﬀects.5
Table 1: Bets and payoﬀs
possible choices coin shows Head coin shows Tail
ball is blue ball is yellow ball is blue ball is yellow
blue if Head & blue if Tail 5 0 5 0
blue if Head & yellow if Tail 5 0 0 5
yellow if Head & blue if Tail 0 5 5 0
yellow if Head & yellow if Tail 0 5 0 5
Notice that betting on either “blue if Head & blue if Tail” or “yellow if Head & yellow
if Tail” results in an ambiguous payoﬀ (determined by the distribution of blue and yellow
balls). Meanwhile, betting on either “blue if Head & yellow if Tail” or “yellow if Head &
blue if Tail” results in the same objective 50:50 lottery (“roulette wheel”), regardless of
which ball is drawn. The latter two options, then, allow for a rather clear opportunity for
subjects to hedge away all ambiguity (but not risk). See Section 3 for more details on this
issue.
The treatments of our experiment diﬀered with respect to the timing in which the four
design elements listed in Table 2 were performed. Accordingly, the three treatments are
called DecDrawFlipReveal (first, subjects make a decision, then the ball is drawn from
the urn, then the coin is flipped, then the coin is revealed), DecFlipRevealDraw, and
FlipDecRevealDraw.
Table 2: Elements of the design
element description
Coin Flip A coin is flipped under a cup
Flip Reveal The result of the coin flip is revealed to subjects
Ball Draw A ball is drawn from the urn and revealed to subjects
Decision Subjects make bets contingent on coin flip and ball draw
Instructions (see Appendix A) were written on paper and distributed at the beginning
of each session. The draws from the urn and the tosses of coins were performed by diﬀerent
5However, this also meant that we had to forgo the opportunity to gather additional information, e.g.
on subjects risk or ambiguity attitudes.
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subjects. The urns and the cup were on display during the experiment, so that subjects
could be certain that their contents could not be manipulated. Subjects were allowed to
verify the urns’ contents after the experiment, and some did. Participants were invited
from a database using ORSEE (Greiner, 2015). The experiment was conducted in the
AWI-lab at the University of Heidelberg, using pen and paper. For each of the three
treatments, we have 60 independent observations (58 in DecFlipRevealDraw due to no-
shows). Experiments lasted about 30 minutes, including instruction time. Average earnings
from the experiment amounted to approximately 5.50 euro.
3 Hypotheses
Saito (2015) nicely illustrates the situation subjects face in our experiment with diagrams
like the ones shown in Figure 1. The left tree shows a situation as in our DecDrawFlipReveal
treatment. First, the winning ball is drawn from the urn, then the coin is tossed. By
choosing to bet on “blue if Head & yellow if Tail” (from now on shortened to “by”) or
“yellow if Head & blue if Tail” (“yb”) the subject can guarantee himself an objective
lottery of 50:50 for winning 5. All ambiguity is hedged away. Regardless of whether a
blue ball or a yellow ball is drawn, the subject receives the same Anscombe-Aumann act.6
If, on the other hand, the subject chooses blue (or yellow) regardless of the coin toss (as
in the center tree), then the ambiguity about the number of blue and yellow balls is still
very much present. Thus, our first hypothesis is that subjects recognize and prefer the
opportunity to hedge.
Hypothesis I Subjects will choose a bet that allows them to hedge (i.e. either “yb”or
“by”) in treatment DecDrawFlipReveal.
The right panel in Figure 1 shows the situation in our treatment DecFlipRevealDraw.
Arguably, after the coin is tossed, the subject faces again an ambiguous situation.7 Whether
or not subjects consider the situation in the left and the right panel as diﬀerent is an
important question that has not been studied experimentally. Theoretically, it depends on
whether the Reversal of Order axiom holds. “[The RoO axiom says that ] if the prize you
6Thus we implicitly assume the Anscombe-Aumann framework. Eichberger and Kelsey (1996) show that
in a Savage framework a preference for randomization need not exist.
7 It is often argued (see e.g. Saito, 2015) that the subject faces a commitment problem after letting the
coin decide on which ball to bet. This is correct but we solved this problem for our subjects by providing
automatic commitment.
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Figure 1: Left panel: The situation induced by betting on “by” in treatment Dec-
DrawFlipReveal. Center panel: betting on “bb” in treatment DecDrawFlipReveal. Right
panel: betting on “by” in treatment DecFlipRevealDraw.
Note: The solid lines correspond to the risk introduced by flipping a coin, while the dotted lines correspond
to the ambiguity of the color of the drawn ball.
receive is to be determined both by a horse race and the spin of a roulette wheel, then it is
immaterial whether the wheel is spun before or after the race.” (Anscombe and Aumann,
1963, p. 201). Both Seo (2009) and Saito (2015) express doubts whether the RoO axiom
holds and develop their theories under the assumption that it does not. This leads us to
Hypothesis II Subjects will hedge less in treatment DecFlipRevealDraw than in Dec-
DrawFlipReveal.
Predictions for our treatment FlipDecRevealDraw are less clear cut. Baillon et al.
(2015) argue that this sequence makes the RLIS incentive compatible. One argument
would be that, given that the coin is already tossed (but not revealed), when subjects
make their decisions, subjects face a fully ambiguous decision. This implies that hedging
would be even less of an issue. Thus, we propose
Hypothesis III Subjects will hedge less in treatment FlipDecRevealDraw than in DecFlipRe-
vealDraw.
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Figure 2: Percentage of hedgers by treatment.
Note: Error bars show 95% confidence intervals based on binomial distributions. Subjects are counted as
hedgers if they chose bets “by” or “yb”.
4 Results
The results of our experiment can easily be summarized in Figure 2, which shows the
percentage of hedgers across treatments.8 A subject is counted as hedger if he chose “blue
if Head & yellow if Tail” or “yellow if Head & blue if Tail”.
With respect to Hypothesis I, we find little support. In treatment DecDrawFlipReveal
only roughly one third of subjects chose to hedge, a level of hedging which is significantly
below 50% (we would expect 50% hedging if subjects chose randomly). A binomial test
rejects the null hypothesis that the percentage of hedgers is 50% (  005, two-sided).
This suggests an aversion to hedging and supports the finding of Dominiak and Schnedler
(2011).9 Of course some people may still be intentionally hedging, but it would appear
that these people are not in the majority even when the opportunity to hedge is as obvious
as in our investigation. Moreover, since we avoid the commitment problem (see footnote
7) and since random selection would result in 50% hedging, a level of hedging below 50%
8A more detailed analsysis along with a control treatment that controls for order eﬀects can be found
in Appendix B.
9Dominiak and Schnedler (2011) elicited the willingness to pay for various bets. Their “chameleon ticket”
is comparable to the “by” bet in our DecFlipRevealDraw treatment. However, Dominiak and Schnedler
(2011) did not vary the timing of the coin toss and the draw from the urn.
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is actually rather striking.
With respect to Hypotheses II and III, we also find very little support. The RoO axiom
seems to hold, as there is no significant diﬀerence in the percentage of hedgers between
DecFlipRevealDraw and DecDrawFlipReveal (2-tests,  = 080). Likewise, there are no
significant diﬀerences across the other treatments using pairwise or joint 2-tests (  023).
When the coin is flipped before the decision, as in treatment FlipDecRevealDraw, we find
a slightly lower percentage of hedgers. However, this diﬀerence is not significant.
5 Conclusion
The Random-Lottery Incentive System (RLIS) was designed to prevent spillovers from one
decision in an experiment to another. For ambiguity experiments, several papers (Oechssler
and Roomets, 2014, Bade, 2015, Kuzmics, 2015) have argued that this may not be fully
successful. Potentially, the typical Ellsberg urn experiment allows subject to hedge away
ambiguity if they combine several decisions. This may or may not depend on the order
in which the “horse race” (draw from ambiguous urn) and the “roulette wheel” (risky
coin toss) are performed. For the latter question, the empirical validity of Anscombe and
Aumann’s (1963) Reversal of Order axiom is crucial.
In this paper we addressed two questions using an experiment. (1) Does the order of
coin toss, urn draw, and decision matter at all in experiments? To our knowledge this is
the first experimental test of the reversal of order axiom. (2) Do subjects actually hedge
by combining several decisions in an experiment?
We found that (1) the reversal of order axiom seems to hold. Subjects were not signif-
icantly influenced by the order of coin flip, urn draw, and decision. And (2) the majority
of subjects did not take up the opportunity to hedge, even when the opportunity was pre-
sented to them on a silver platter. Thus, it seems that experimenters do not need to worry
too much about potential hedging opportunities, even if they are theoretically interesting.
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Appendix (for online publication only)
A Instructions
[English translation of the German instructions for Treatment FlipDecRevealDraw. The
other treatments were modified in the obvious way.]
Instruction Sheet
Welcome to our experiment and thanks for participating.
Please turn oﬀ your mobile phone and do not communicate with other participants. If
you have any questions, just raise your hand and we will come to you to answer them.
All participants who observe the rules will definitely receive a payment of 3 euros for
participation. You can earn an additional 5 euros, depending on your decisions and on the
outcome of a lottery. At the end of the experiment you will receive your total payment in
cash, with anonymity assured.
On the table the experimenters have a bag containing 24 marbles, each of them either
blue or yellow. You do not know how many marbles are blue and how many are yellow.
Any combination, from 0 blue marbles (that is, 24 yellow marbles), to 24 blue marbles
(that is, 0 yellow marbles) is possible. At the end of the experiment you are free to check
the content of the bag.
On the table there is also a dice cup containing a fair coin.
The experiment is executed as follows:
1. A randomly selected participant shakes the dice cup containing the coin.
2. On the decision form you make two decisions, each requiring a choice between
two options.
3. The result of the coin flipping (heads or tails) is communicated.
4. Another randomly selected participant draws a marble from the bag without
looking at the bag.
5. The color of the marble is communicated.
6. You receive your payoﬀ in accordance with the payment table given below
Your payoﬀ depends on the color of the drawn marble, on the result of the coin flipping,
and on the decisions you have made. For example, if you decide on “blue if head” and
“yellow if tail”, you get 5 euros (in addition to the 3 euros guaranteed) if the drawn marble
is blue and the coin shows “head” or if the drawn marble is yellow and the coin shows
“tail”. If you choose “blue if head” and “blue if tail”, then you win 5 euros if the drawn
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marble is blue and the coin shows “head” or “tail”. The two other options are defined
accordingly.
The combinations are shown in the payment table below (additionally you receive 3
euros for participating):
Options Coin shows Head Coin shows Tail
Marble Marble Marble Marble
is blue is yellow is blue is yellow
blue if Head & blue if Tail 5 0 5 0
blue if Head & yellow if Tail 5 0 0 5
yellow if Head & blue if Tail 0 5 5 0
yellow if Head & yellow if Tail 0 5 0 5
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Decision Sheet
Please select exactly one of the two options in case the coin shows head:
¤ Blue if “head”
¤ Yellow if “head”
Please select exactly one of the two options in case the coin shows tail:
¤ Blue if “tail”
¤ Yellow if “tail”




Your field of study:
¤ Economics (e.g. Political Economy, Business Economics, . . . )
¤ Other
After making your decisions, submit the Decision Sheet to the experimenters. Make
sure you do not give away the instruction sheet. At the top is printed the Participant No.,
which you will need to pick up your payoﬀ afterwards.
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Figure 3: Color choice by subjects; e.g. “yb” means chosing color yellow in th first block
(if “head”) and blue in the second (if “tail”).
B Robustness treatment
When analyzing, in more detail, the choice in our three main treatments, a distinct order
eﬀect is noticeable. In the decision sheet (see Appendix A), subjects were presented with a
2 blocks of 2 questions. The color blue always came before the color yellow. Figure 3 shows
the proportions of subjects choosing the two colors in the two blocks. In all treatments,
subjects chose “bb” much more often than “yy” and “by” more often than “yb”. It seems
plausible that most subjects who did not want to hedge were indiﬀerent between “bb” and
“yy” and chose “bb” because it came first on the questionnaire. Similarly, subjects who
wanted to hedge were likely indiﬀerent between “by” and ”yb”. Nevertheless, our order
could have introduced a bias, since the non-hedging choice “bb” is the default choice if a
subject always chooses the first option on the questionnaire.
To control for this possible bias, we ran a control treatment (DecDrawFlipReveal*),
with 57 new subjects, that was identical to DecDrawFlipReveal except that the decision
sheet posed the questions in a diﬀerent order:
Please select exactly one of the two options in case the coin shows head:
¤ Yellow if “head”
¤ Blue if “head”
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Figure 4: Percentage of hedgers when “bb” is presented first in questionnaire (left bar) or
“yb” is presented first (right bar)
Please select exactly one of the two options in case the coin shows tail:
¤ Blue if “tail”
¤ Yellow if “tail”
In treatment DecDrawFlipReveal*, hedging becomes the default choice if a subject
always chooses the first option.
Figure 4 compares the proportion of hedgers in treatments DecDrawFlipReveal* and
DecDrawFlipReveal. Although hedging increased from 33% to 44%, there is no significant
diﬀerence according to a 2 test ( = 022). Thus, it seems there may some focality in our
questionnaire design, however, any eﬀect seemed to be minor, as it did not significantly
impact the results. Importantly, even by making hedging a more focal option in the
questionnaire, we still saw less than 50% hedging in absolute terms.
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